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DISTINGUISHING THE “TRULY NATIONAL”
FROM THE “TRULY LOCAL”:
CUSTOMARY ALLOCATION, COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
NEIL S. SIEGEL†

We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local. In recognizing this fact we preserve one of
the few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was
adopted. The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence
that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of
the States.
1
– Chief Justice Rehnquist
ABSTRACT
This Essay makes two claims about different methods of defining
the expanse and limits of the Commerce Clause.
My first claim is that approaches that privilege traditional subjects
of state regulation are unworkable and undesirable. These approaches
are unworkable in light of the frequency with which the federal
government and the states regulate the same subject matter in our
world of largely overlapping federal and state legislative jurisdiction.
The approaches are undesirable because the question of customary
allocation is unrelated to the principal reason why Congress possesses
the power to regulate interstate commerce: solving collective action
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problems involving multiple states. These problems are evident in the
way that some federal judges invoked regulatory custom in litigation
over the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The areas of “health
insurance” and “health care” are not of exclusive state concern, and it
is impossible to lose—or to win—a competition requiring skillful
lawyers or judges to describe them as more state than federal, or more
federal than state. Nor is it most important what the answer is.
More promising are the approaches that view congressional
authority as turning on either commercial activity or collective action
problems facing the states. My second claim is that these two
approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and that the choice
between them exemplifies the more general tension between applying
rules and applying their background justifications. I have previously
defended a collective action approach to Article I, Section 8. My
primary purpose in this Essay is to clarify the jurisprudential stakes in
adopting one method or the other and to identify the problems that
advocates of each approach must address.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress
possesses
the
authority
“[t]o
regulate
2
Commerce . . . among the several States” primarily so that it can
solve collective action problems like the ones that the states faced
under the Articles of Confederation, when Congress lacked the

2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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3

power to regulate interstate commerce. Most of the eighteen clauses
in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution likewise give
4
Congress the authority to solve multistate collective action problems.
The commerce power in particular, however, possesses perhaps the
greatest potential to collapse the “distinction between what is truly
5
national and what is truly local.” There are three main judicial
strategies for maintaining such a distinction in Commerce Clause
6
cases.
One historic strategy, which has few adherents today, is to
invoke what is asserted to be the customary allocation of regulatory
authority between the federal government and the states. Most often,
this approach is formulated in a way that is akin to “dual federalism,”
which died in 1937 because it proved unable to define unique and
7
exclusive spheres of federal and state legislative jurisdiction. The
method of customary allocation identifies so-called traditional
subjects of state regulation. It regards subject matters that “ha[ve]
8
always been the province of the States” as beyond the reach of
federal commerce power.
The unworkability of this approach has led to a toned-down
version of it, which continues to show up in the Court’s jurisprudence.
3. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (“Article I, Section 8 of
the new Constitution gave Congress additional powers to address collective action problems.”).
4. See id. at 144–50 (explaining how various clauses of Article I, Section 8 solve particular
collective action problems).
5. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18; see also Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 118 (discussing
how the Supreme Court “historically has gone back and forth between imposing essentially no
limits on the scope of the commerce power and imposing a series of dubious formal
distinctions”).
6. One could identify various political safeguards of federalism as limiting the scope of the
commerce power. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 2 (1980) (arguing that “state interests are forcefully represented in the
national political process”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 360 (noting that the judicial
focus in vindicating federalism is now “on the nature of the political process responsible for
making the federalism-related decisions”); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954) (suggesting that “the national political process in the United
States . . . is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on
the domain of the states”). The inquiry in this Essay, however, focuses on judicially enforceable
limits.
7. For an illuminating discussion of the rise and fall of dual federalism, see generally
Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception,
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 139–50 (2001).
8. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
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The Rehnquist Court identified traditional subjects of state regulation
as a factor or consideration in its Commerce Clause analysis, but not
as exhausting the constitutional inquiry. According to the Court,
those regulatory areas include criminal law, education, and family
9
law.
Second, the modern Court distinguishes between “commercial”
or “economic” activity on the one hand, and “noncommercial” or
“noneconomic” activity on the other. The Court allows Congress to
use its commerce power to regulate only commercial subject matter in
10
cases involving allegedly substantial effects on interstate commerce.
Although the Rehnquist Court referenced traditional subjects of state
regulation as supporting its invalidations of federal laws on federalism
11
grounds, the Court’s formal distinction between commercial and
noncommercial activity did more of the work in its Commerce Clause
12
rulings.
A third possible approach is to interpret the commerce power in
light of its primary underlying justification, which is to empower
Congress to solve multistate collective action problems. Scholars who
advocate this approach distinguish problems whose solution requires
collective action by states, which they view as within the scope of
federal commerce power, from problems whose solution requires
individual action by states, which they regard as beyond the reach of
13
the commerce power. This approach accounts for the results reached
9. For a discussion, see infra Part II.
10. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) (“Where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” (quoting
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (same). The Court’s pre-Lopez doctrine, which asked whether Congress
could rationally have concluded that the regulated subject matter substantially affects interstate
commerce in the aggregate, is probably not an approach to limiting the scope of the commerce
power. It seems to reflect a regime in which there are no judicially enforceable limits on the
commerce power.
11. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (distinguishing between subjects that are “truly
national” and those that are “truly local”).
12. For a discussion, see infra Part III.
13. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23–31 (2010)
(articulating the collective action component of his theory of the commerce power); Cooter &
Siegel, supra note 3 (articulating a theory of Article I, Section 8 that focuses on collective action
problems involving multiple states); Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The
Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 14–18 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/981.pdf (explaining why individual action by states cannot
solve the problems addressed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub.
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029); Donald H. Regan, How To Think About the
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by the Rehnquist Court in its commerce-power rulings better than the
Court’s own proffered distinction between commercial and
14
noncommercial activity. The approach also tracks Justice Ginsburg’s
emphasis on multistate collective action problems in her opinion for
four Justices in National Federation of Independent Business v.
15
Sebelius (NFIB).
This Essay makes two claims about these three methods of
defining the expanse and limits of the Commerce Clause. First,
approaches that privilege traditional subjects of state regulation are
unworkable and undesirable. These approaches are unworkable in
light of the frequency with which the federal government and the
states regulate the same subject matter in our modern world of
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
554 (1995) (arguing that the Commerce Clause should be understood to authorize Congress to
address problems requiring action by multiple states); Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits
That the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591, 603–09 (2011)
[hereinafter Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits] (identifying the distinction between individual
and collective action by states as a principled, judicially enforceable limit on the commerce
power); Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the
Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 [hereinafter Siegel, Free Riding
on Benevolence] (identifying how the ACA addresses multistate collective action problems);
Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335 (1934) (examining the proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention and concluding that the
drafting history of Article I, Section 8 helps to justify federal commerce power in instances of
separate state incompetence).
14. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 162–64 (“Although current doctrine formally
emphasizes the economic or noneconomic nature of the regulated activity, a more functional
logic may in fact have animated the Court in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. Just as the Court
offered collective action problems as a reason to sustain congressional regulation in many of the
Commerce Clause cases decided from 1937 until the early 1990s, so too the Rehnquist Court
implicitly has offered the absence (or presence) of a collective action problem as a reason to
prohibit (or sustain) congressional regulation.”).
15. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2615–16 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined this part of Ginsburg’s opinion. The other five
Justices articulated a new distinction between regulating and requiring commerce. See id. at
2589 (Roberts, C.J.) (“The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not
to compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress's actions have reflected this
understanding. There is no reason to depart from that understanding now.”); see id. at 2649
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[I]t must be activity affecting commerce
that is regulated, and not merely the failure to engage in commerce . . . . Our test’s
premise . . . rests upon the Constitution’s requirement that it be commerce which is regulated. If
all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is everything.”). This distinction
cannot constitute a freestanding approach to defining the expanse and limits of the Commerce
Clause because only one federal law in American history has even arguably implicated the
distinction: the minimum coverage provision in the ACA. To my knowledge, no defender of this
distinction argues that it should replace, as opposed to supplement, the Court’s distinction
between economic and noneconomic subject matter.
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largely overlapping federal and state legislative jurisdiction. Either a
regulated area is never of exclusive state concern, or else the answer
will turn on arbitrary—and increasingly narrow—definitions of the
breadth of the area at issue. Moreover, if “traditional” is redefined to
mean a subject of predominant, though not exclusive, state concern,
then the inquiry will often prove indeterminate.
In addition to being unworkable, approaches that privilege
traditional subjects of state regulation are undesirable. They are
undesirable because the question of customary allocation is unrelated
to the principal reason why Congress possesses the power to regulate
interstate commerce: solving collective action problems involving
multiple states.
These problems are evident in the way that some federal
judges—although none of the Justices—invoked regulatory custom in
litigation over the constitutionality of the minimumcoverage
16
provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).
The areas of “health insurance” and “health care” are not of
exclusive state concern, and it is impossible to lose—or to win—a
competition requiring skillful lawyers or judges to describe them as
more state than federal, or more federal than state. This facet of the
litigation brings to mind Tic-Tac-Toe, a boring game for sophisticated
players because it is impossible to win or lose.
More promising are approaches that view congressional
authority as turning on either commercial activity or collective action
problems facing the states. This Essay’s second claim is that the
commercial activity and collective action approaches have advantages
and disadvantages, and that the choice between them exemplifies the
more general tension between applying rules and applying their
background justifications. In previous work with Professor Robert
Cooter, I have articulated a collective action approach to Article I,
17
Section 8. My primary purpose here is to clarify the jurisprudential
stakes in adopting one method or the other, and to identify the
problems that advocates of each approach must address.

16. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029). The law requires, among many other things, that most lawful permanent residents of
the United States either maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage (the minimum
coverage provision), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. IV 2011), or else pay a certain amount of
money each year (the shared responsibility payment), id. § 5000A(b)(1).
17. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 118–19.
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I begin with constitutional theory. Part I discusses the primary
historical and contemporary justification for the Commerce Clause. I
then move to three methods of operationalizing the Commerce
Clause through legal doctrine. Part II examines approaches that turn
on the customary allocation of different subject matters to different
sovereigns. Part III analyzes the virtues and vulnerabilities of the
strategies that favor commercial activity or collective action. The
Conclusion suggests a different possibility—that the commercial
activity and collective action approaches could form part of one
overarching implementation of the Commerce Clause. It then
explains why federalism formalists and functionalists are unlikely to
converge on the same solution—and, yet, why both approaches may
continue to influence the Court’s decision making.
I. THEORY: THE PRIMARY JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
18

As I have written elsewhere, the Framers drafted Article I,
Section 8 primarily to empower Congress to ameliorate serious
problems of collective action facing the states during the Critical
19
Period of the 1780s. In the wake of the American Revolution, the
states acted individually when they needed to act collectively,
discriminating against commerce coming from sister states and free
riding on the contributions of other states to the federal treasury and
military. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the
20
power to solve these problems.
James Madison decried the discord among the states in his Vices
21
of the Political System of the United States, which he wrote while
22
preparing for the Constitutional Convention. Recording various
18. Id. at 121–24.
19. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 616–23 (1999)
(arguing that, under the Articles of Confederation, “many of the Union’s difficulties could not
have been met without more ambitious changes in the structure of the government” and that
the Commerce Clause was one such change).
20. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (identifying
national finances, foreign relations, and westward expansion as instances in which the Articles
of Confederation failed to give Congress adequate power to address important national issues).
21. See JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 69–70 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (lamenting the failure of states to
comply with requisitions under the Articles of Confederation, their encroachments on federal
authority and on the rights of other states, and their violations of treaties).
22. RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 46.
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problems with the Articles of Confederation, Madison stressed the
“want of concert in matters where common interest requires it,” a
“defect . . . strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial affairs.
How much has the national dignity, interest, and revenue suffered
23
from this cause?” When conduct such as tariff barriers spilled over
from one state to another, Madison and other nationalist Framers
recognized that the actions of individually rational states produced
irrational results for the nation. The solution ultimately sought for
these and other collective action problems was the establishment of a
more comprehensive unit of government with the authority to tax,
borrow money on credit, raise and support a military, and regulate
24
interstate commerce, thereby creating a national free-trade zone.
The delegates at the Philadelphia Convention focused on
multistate collective action problems in describing the scope of
federal power that would become Section 8. The Convention
instructed the midsummer Committee of Detail that Congress would
be entrusted with authority “to legislate in all Cases for the general
Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are
separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United
25
States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.”
This language registers the importance of ameliorating various
collective action problems facing the states. When the Committee of
Detail made its report ten days later, “[i]t had changed the indefinite
language . . . into an enumeration of the powers of Congress closely
resembling Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution as it was finally
26
adopted.”
The Convention “accepted without discussion the enumeration
27
of powers made by [the] committee.” The delegates must have
perceived the connection between the general principles conveyed to
the Committee of Detail and the specific powers listed in Section 8,
including the Commerce Clause. The Committee was embodying

23. MADISON, supra note 21, at 71.
24. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“[The Constitution]
was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”).
25. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966).
26. Stern, supra note 13, at 1340.
27. Id.
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these general principles, not rejecting them, when it provided an
28
enumeration.
Enabling Congress to solve multistate problems of collective
action was, and remains, the primary justification for giving Congress
29
the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” It
may not be the only justification; constitutional provisions are often
written in vague, value-laden language, which enables the ascription
of multiple, contested justifications to them. But in light of the
historical background out of which the Commerce Clause arose, and
in light of its present role in American life in addressing races to the
30
bottom and interstate externalities, solving multistate collective
action problems qualifies as the primary background justification for
the Clause.
II. DOCTRINE: CUSTOM AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
With an understanding of the core justification of the commerce
power in hand, I turn in this Part and the next to three methods of
operationalizing the Commerce Clause through legal doctrine.
Because many laws can plausibly be described as regulations of
interstate commerce, or as necessary and proper to the regulation of
31
interstate commerce, the commerce power has the potential to
unravel the principle of limited federal power. This potential has led
to three approaches to restrict the scope of the clause.

28. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 13, at 556 (“[T]here is no reason to think the Committee of
Detail was rejecting the spirit of the Resolution when they replaced it with an enumeration.”);
Stern, supra note 13, at 1340 (“If the Convention had thought that the committee’s enumeration
was a departure from the general standard for the division of powers to which it had thrice
agreed, there can be little doubt that the subject would have been thoroughly debated on the
Convention floor.”).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. Many federal laws, including statutes regulating securities, the environment, civil rights,
public health, and criminality, fit this description. See, e.g., Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence,
supra note 13, at 46–47 (defining collective action problems for the states and discussing
examples in the areas of environmental law and civil rights); see also Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2342 (1996)
(“The two justifications most prominently offered . . . for environmental regulation at the
federal level focus on the existence of a ‘race to the bottom’ and of interstate externalities.”).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress to pass laws that are “necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution” Congress’s other enumerated powers).
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A. The Unworkability of Custom
One strategy, which has noteworthy historical roots in American
constitutional law, is to invoke the idea of the customary allocation of
subject-matter authority between the federal government and the
32
states. For example, in United States v. Lopez and United States v.
33
Morrison, the Court invalidated two federal laws as beyond the
scope of the commerce power for the first time since the 1930s: the
34
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and the provision of the
35
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 giving victims of gender36
motivated violence a private civil-damages remedy. In Lopez and
Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to support these rulings
by identifying criminal law, education, and family law as traditional
37
subjects of state regulation. Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in Lopez inquired “whether the exercise of national power
38
seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern” —that is,
39
“an area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise.”
He concluded that “[a]n interference of these dimensions occurs here,
for it is well established that education is a traditional concern of the
40
States.”
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, some federal courts
invoked another allegedly traditional subject of state concern in
litigation over the constitutionality of the ACA. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit invalidated
32. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
34. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1994) (making it a
crime “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone”), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
35. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, §§ 40001–40703, 108
Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 42 U.S.C.) invalidated in part by
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994) (authorizing victims of gender-motivated violence to sue
their assailants for money damages in federal court), invalidated by Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
37. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (“The regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States.”); id. at 615–16 (“Petitioners’ reasoning,
moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be
applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly
significant.”).
38. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 583.
40. Id. at 580.
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the law’s minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility
41
payment. These provisions require that most lawful residents of the
United States either obtain a minimum level of health insurance
42
coverage or pay a certain amount of money each year. In supporting
its holding that the provisions were beyond the scope of the
commerce power, the Eleventh Circuit invoked the “Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence” for the proposition that, “in
assessing the constitutionality of Congress’s exercise of its commerce
authority, a relevant factor is whether a particular federal regulation
43
trenches on an area of traditional state concern.” The court of
appeals then concluded that “insurance qualifies as an area of
traditional state regulation,” that “[t]he health care industry . . . falls
within the sphere of traditional state regulation,” and that “the
narrower category of ‘health care’ is an area of traditional state
44
concern.” The court added “this federalism factor” to “numerous
indicia of constitutional infirmity” and concluded that the provisions
45
under review were beyond the scope of the commerce power.
The Eleventh Circuit’s invocation of legislative custom, like the
Supreme Court’s in Lopez and Morrison, illustrates two problems
with identifying traditional subjects of state regulation in Commerce
Clause litigation. First, the approach is generally unworkable. Second,
the approach is undesirable because it is insensitive to whether the
states face collective action problems.
As to the first problem, the Eleventh Circuit’s assertions about
regulatory tradition are erroneous if the court was suggesting that the
states exclusively or uniquely have regulated “insurance,” “the health
care industry,” or “health care.” The federal government, too, has
long regulated extensively in the fields of health insurance and health
care. Indeed, the federal government has also regulated extensively in
46
47
48
the areas of criminal law, education, family law, and other
41. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
43. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1303.
44. Id. at 1305–06.
45. Id. at 1307.
46. 18 U.S.C. (2006).
47. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
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traditional subjects of state regulation identified by the Court in
49
Lopez and Morrison.
Judge Marcus recognized his colleagues’ error, writing in dissent
in the Eleventh Circuit case that “Congress has extensively exercised
its commerce power to regulate the health insurance market for many
50
years, long before the [ACA] was passed.” He further noted that
Congress has often regulated the content of private health insurance
51
policies. He also observed that Congress has long regulated health
52
care providers. And he pointed out that Congress “has extensively
regulated under its commerce power the commodities used in the
health care services market, most notably drugs and medical
53
devices.” Finally, he underscored concededly constitutional federal
regulations of the prices to be paid for consuming health care
54
services.
48. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1297 (1998) (noting the significant involvement of the federal government in regulating
the family since Reconstruction).
49. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 615–16 (2000); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 172 (2011) (“[T]he federal
government has regulated family law since at least Reconstruction, and it has regulated
education heavily in the last fifty years. And, of course, the federal government has attacked
crime since the beginning of the Republic and with increasing frequency in the twentieth
century.” (footnote omitted)).
50. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1333–34 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.); Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); and Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.)).
51. Id. at 1334 (pointing to the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit.
VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26); Newborns’
and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VI, 110 Stat. 2935
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-25, 300gg-51); Women’s Health
and Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. IX, 112 Stat. 2681-436 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185b, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-27, 300gg-52); and Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, tit. V,
subtit. B, 122 Stat. 3881 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9812, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-26)).
52. Id. at 1335 (discussing the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040
(1946); Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, tit. IX, subtit.
A, pt. 1, subpt. B, § 9121(b), 100 Stat. 164 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2006)); and HIPAA).
53. Id. (referring to portions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.)).
54. Id. at 1336 (referring to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)).
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The D.C. Circuit agreed with Judge Marcus. “Appellants have
not argued that health care and health insurance are uniquely state
concerns,” the court wrote, “and decades of established federal
55
legislation in these areas suggest the contrary.” Moreover, the court
rejected the idea that “states’ powers over health and general welfare
56
make the health care industry a traditional state concern.”
The D.C. Circuit correctly recognized the federal government’s
heavy involvement in the provision and regulation of health insurance
and health care in the United States. As the government stated in its
brief to the Eleventh Circuit:
Medicare . . . insures virtually all Americans aged 65 or older, as well
as several million others with certain disabilities. In 2009, the federal
government spent approximately $500 billion on Medicare—22% of
total spending on health care consumption in the country.
The federal and state governments jointly finance access to
health care for low-income persons through Medicaid and the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In 2009, combined
spending on these programs was approximately $390 billion—17%
of total spending on health care consumption in the United States.
Medicaid and CHIP paid for the health care of 37.6 million
57
nonelderly individuals, 14.2% of the nonelderly population.
58

Since the Eisenhower administration, the federal government
has secured employer-sponsored health insurance through use of
59
Congress’s tax power for regulatory purposes. Pursuant to a tax
subsidy for employment-based health insurance that amounted to
60
$242 billion in 2009, employees generally do not include as income
or pay taxes on the payments of their health insurance premiums by
61
their employers. This favorable tax treatment contrasts with most

55. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
56. Id.
57. Brief for Petitioners at 3–4, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (No. 11-398) (2012).
58. For an account of the history, see generally DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A.
MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 99–130
(2009).
59. For an argument that Congress may use its tax power for some regulatory purposes in
addition to revenue-raising purposes, see generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the
Power To Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012).
60. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 57, at 4.
61. 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
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other forms of employee compensation. Moreover, employers may
62
deduct their premium payments as business expenses.
Finally, the plaintiffs themselves in the ACA litigation conceded
that the Commerce Clause supports the fundamental changes that the
ACA makes in the ways insurance companies do business and control
costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs did not challenge the ACA provisions
prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage based on
pre-existing conditions, canceling insurance absent fraud, charging
higher premiums based on medical history, and imposing lifetime
63
limits on benefits. The Supreme Court has long held that Congress
64
may use the Commerce Clause to regulate insurance markets.
When the ACA litigation reached the Supreme Court, no Justice
responded by characterizing the ACA as operating in an area of
traditional state concern. On the contrary, Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, stressed that “the Federal
Government plays a lead role in the health-care sector, both as a
65
direct payer and as a regulator.” Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts
made no mention of traditional subjects of state regulation in his
decisive opinion, even as he concluded that the ACA’s minimum
66
coverage provision was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.
And the joint dissenters—Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito—invoked traditional areas of state concern only in making
general points about the need for limits on the Spending Clause, in
the part of their opinion that considered the ACA’s expansion of
67
Medicaid. They declared the minimum coverage provision beyond
the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause,

62. Id. § 162.
63. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (Supp. IV 2011).
64. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (“No
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held
to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot
make an exception of the business of insurance.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091(3) (Supp. IV 2011)
(citing South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n as authority for the proposition that “insurance is
interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation”).
65. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2628 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (pointing to Medicare, Medicaid, ERISA, and
HIPAA).
66. Id. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.). Roberts instead upheld the minimum coverage provision
under Congress’s tax power. Id. at 2600. For a theory of the tax power that is consistent with
almost all of the Chief Justice’s analysis, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 59.
67. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643, 2659, 2661–62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
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and the Taxing Clause without invoking traditional subjects of state
concern.
It is false to call fields such as “insurance,” “health insurance,”
“health care,” or the “health care industry” exclusive or unique
subjects of state regulation when the same areas are also subjects of
substantial and longstanding federal concern. If the test of tradition
sounds in exclusivity, federal power is virtually limitless. To avoid this
conclusion, one would have to keep redefining the regulated “area”
more and more narrowly, so as to find a level of abstraction at which
it is possible to describe the federal government as not previously
having regulated that area. That recourse, however, seems arbitrary.
Dual federalism died and has been little mourned because of the
difficulty of defining and policing the boundaries of the assertedly
68
separate spheres of federal and state authority.
Alternatively, one could (re)define traditional subjects of state
concern as areas where historically there has been “more” state
regulation than federal regulation—that is, where state regulation has
predominated. Such a reconceptualization of regulatory custom is
more defensible in theory, and may work in practice with respect to
certain subject matters. For example, in his opinion invalidating part
69
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Judge Boudin
may have been right that “domestic relations and the definition and
incidents of lawful marriage” is “a realm that has from the start of the
70
nation been primarily confided to state regulation.” This may be so
even if the area of “domestic relations” seems considerably broader
than “the definition and incidents of lawful marriage” and it is not
71
obvious which level of abstraction to choose. In many instances,
however, the approach will prove indeterminate and thus
68. See, e.g., Young, supra note 7, at 139.
69. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
70. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012).
The court in Massachusetts held that section 3(a) of the federal DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates
equal protection principles, Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 15. Section 3 defines “marriage” for
purposes of federal law and excludes same-sex marriage from this definition. DOMA § 3, 1
U.S.C. § 7.
71. The court in Massachusetts raised its level of scrutiny based on its federalism concern
that “DOMA intrudes extensively into a realm that has from the start of the nation been
primarily confided to state regulation.” Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12. The court did not
persuasively explain the propriety of its novel use of federalism concerns to change the level of
scrutiny under equal protection. The decision does, however, nicely illustrate that invocations of
regulatory custom can cut both ways ideologically. There is no reason to think it is less
problematic when used in the service of certain ends than it is when used in the service of
others.
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unworkable. It does not seem difficult to describe many subject
matter categories as either extensively state or as extensively federal.
That is one moral of the above discussion of how different courts
have characterized the regulation of health insurance and health care.
Moreover, some cases may plausibly be described as involving
multiple subject matters, some predominantly federal and others
72
predominantly state. This approach does not seem to be a promising
way of deciding Commerce Clause cases in a reasonably predictable,
transparent way.
There is nothing new about this problem. Twice before—first in
the context of intergovernmental tax immunity and then in the
context of federal regulation of the “states qua states”—the Supreme
Court invoked the idea of traditional state governmental functions in
order to police the boundary between federal and state power, only to
abandon the notion when it proved unsusceptible to consistent
73
application. Professor Lawrence Lessig thus wrote of the Lopez
Court’s invocation of traditional subjects of state concern that “it is
too late in this game to forgive the Court for this move. For over and
over, in a wide range of federalism contexts, just this line has proved
74
itself Maginot.”
The unworkability of the first approach, at least as a general
matter, may explain why courts today tone down their invocation of
traditional subjects of state concern in Commerce Clause cases: they

72. Is Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), an immigration case
(federal) or a case involving the licensing of in-state businesses (state)? Is AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), a case involving arbitration (federal) or consumer
protection (state)? For a discussion of the federal and state aspects of these cases, see Ernest A.
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts
Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 336. For a more recent illustration, see Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2525 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), which
characterizes “employment regulation, even of aliens unlawfully present in the country, [a]s an
area of traditional state concern.”
73. See generally New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (rejecting the existing tax
immunity doctrine as resting on an unworkable line between traditional/essential and
nontraditional/nonessential state functions); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which
prohibited regulation of “states qua states” in areas of traditional governmental functions).
74. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125, 206. One doctrinal area in which the analysis of regulatory custom remains relevant is in
preemption cases, see supra note 72, in which the prevailing—albeit not always consistent—view
of the Court seems to be that the application of the presumption against preemption turns on
whether the federal government is intervening in a traditional field of state regulation. Young,
supra note 72, at 332. Professor Young criticizes “the indeterminacy of any approach that tries
to divide up the world into spheres of state and federal primacy.” Id. at 335.
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75

call it only an additional consideration or a “relevant factor,” not a
freestanding approach. For example, the Eleventh Circuit invoked
custom towards the end of its constitutional analysis, only after it had
decided the case on other grounds. Nearly twenty pages earlier in the
opinion, the court reasoned decisively that “the regulated conduct is
defined by the absence of both commerce or even ‘the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities’—the broad definition
76
of economics in Raich.”
But describing custom as just a “factor” does not secure for it a
less problematic role in commerce power cases. To be a factor in any
constitutional analysis, whether of federal power or of individual
77
rights, is to be potentially decisive in close cases. Otherwise, the
alleged factor is not a factor; it is window dressing. Thus, whether
legislative custom is defined in terms of state exclusivity or
predominance, reducing it to a factor does not avoid the above
problems.
B. The Undesirability of Custom
The Eleventh Circuit’s invocation of custom in the health care
litigation illustrates a second problem with approaches that turn on
traditional subjects of state regulation. The court’s depiction of health
insurance and health care as such subjects may have little to do with
the principal purpose of the commerce power discussed in Part I:
enabling Congress to address collective action problems involving
multiple states. Looking to what states have traditionally regulated
may be unhelpful if one is interested in identifying and solving
problems of collective action facing the states. By definition, the
states themselves have inadequate incentives to solve multistate
collective action problems by regulating on their own. Their rationally
self-interested incentives, rather, are to externalize costs onto other
states. Accordingly, there may be a lot of state regulation in an area

75. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1303
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
76. Id. at 1286 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)).
77. For example, to use race as a factor in student admissions or school assignment
decisions is necessarily to use race decisively in close cases, potential appearances
notwithstanding. For discussions, see generally Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of
Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473 (2007); and Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student
Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J.
781 (2006).

SIEGEL IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2012 4:23 PM

814

[Vol. 62:797

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

of traditional state concern, but such regulation may be creating or
exacerbating multistate collective action problems, not solving them.
Moreover, federal regulation may have long been absent for
reasons having little to do with the existence or scope of a collective
action problem. Alternative possibilities include competing political
priorities (such as wars and depressions), changing social values (on
such matters as environmental protection and civil rights), improperly
imposed constitutional constraints on Congress (such as during the
Lochner Era), and effective political resistance by powerful minority
interests in Congress (such as the Southern opposition that doomed
78
federal civil rights legislation in the twentieth century until 1964).
In addition, the scope of collective action problems may change
over time. For instance, whatever may have been the scope of such
problems in health insurance and health care markets in the past,
changes in society, the economy, and technology may mean that the
79
scope of those problems is interstate in the present. Races to the
bottom among states, interstate externalities, and other kinds of
80
collective action problems emerge over time. The customary
allocation of regulatory authority between the federal government
and the states is unlikely to track the existence of significant problems
of collective action facing the states—however preferable reliance on
81
custom may be to cost-benefit calculations in other settings.
Consider, for example, annual spending on health care in the
United States. In this regard, America is a fundamentally different
place than it was fifty years ago, let alone 150 years ago. While
national health care spending was only 5.4 percent of gross domestic
product (or $200 billion) in 1960, such spending amounted to 16.2
percent of GDP (or $2.3 trillion) by 2007 and is projected to be 20.3

78. For a collective action analysis of some of these examples, see Siegel, Free Riding on
Benevolence, supra note 13, at 46–47. For the legislative story of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 2–23 (4th ed.
2007).
79. See BALKIN, supra note 49, at 172 (“If an area of concern has significant spillover
effects on other states, or begins to do so, it shouldn’t matter that it was the traditional concern
of state regulation.”).
80. For a discussion of these problems in the context of health care and health insurance
markets, see generally Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence, supra note 13.
81. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and
History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992) (“[G]iven the
imperfections of the legal system, the conventional wisdom that places cost-benefit analysis first
and custom second [in the law of negligence] is incorrect . . . .”).
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percent of GDP (or $4.4 trillion) by 2018. Of course, these facts do
not themselves establish a multistate collective action problem that
did not previously exist. But they do help to illustrate how such a
problem could emerge—or, for that matter, fade—in a society with
83
vastly different social and economic practices over time.
For the foregoing reasons, courts are wrong to presume that the
unprecedented nature of an exercise of federal power renders the
84
exercise unconstitutional. Chief Justice Roberts avoided imposing
such a presumption in his recent opinion in NFIB, even as he sent
85
mixed signals about the pertinence of past congressional inaction.
82. STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW
HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 64 (2010); see also CHARLES E.
PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 530 (4th ed. 2010) (“In constant dollars per capita, total spending
is estimated to have increased more than 8-fold between 1960 and 2010, and the comparable
spending increase for drugs is almost 10-fold for that period.”).
83. Another good example of changed conditions is the importance of education to
economic productivity in an information economy with easy interstate mobility due to improved
transportation networks. For a discussion of potential spillover effects on other states in such
circumstances, see BALKIN, supra note 49, at 172–73.
84. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159
(2010) (“Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional problem with the
PCAOB [Public Company Accounting Oversight Board] is the lack of historical precedent for
this entity.” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 3138)); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“[I]f . . . earlier
Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the
power was thought not to exist.”). Compare Florida ex rel. Atty’ Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1289 (11th Cir. 2011), (“The fact that Congress has never before
exercised this supposed authority is telling. As the Supreme Court has noted, ‘the utter lack of
statutes imposing obligations on the States’ executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that
course to Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such power.’” (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at
907–08)) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), with Siegel, Four
Constitutional Limits, supra note 13, at 601–02 (“In light of the widespread political
unpopularity of individual mandates in the United States, nationalists can plausibly insist that
the political safeguards of federalism will operate to discipline Congress. This observation about
public perceptions of federal regulation, rather than the Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion about
Congress’s past confessions of unconstitutionality, likely explains why Congress has not made a
habit of imposing purchase mandates throughout American history.” (footnotes omitted)).
85. Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
But Congress has never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals not
engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product. Legislative novelty is not
necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything. But sometimes “the most telling
indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent”
for Congress’s action. At the very least, we should “pause to consider the implications
of the Government’s arguments” when confronted with such new conceptions of
federal power.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting, respectively, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159, and United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Roberts acknowledged that “there

SIEGEL IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2012 4:23 PM

816

[Vol. 62:797

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

The customary allocation of regulatory authority between the
federal government and the states does not appear viable as a factor
in commerce power cases, let alone as a stand-alone approach to the
Commerce Clause. It is not helpful in distinguishing the “truly
86
national” from the “truly local” in the context of the commerce
power.
I underscore the narrowness of my normative claim. I am not
addressing the role of custom in law, or the role of custom in
constitutional law, or the role of custom in questions of constitutional
87
structure, or even the role of custom in all problems of constitutional
88
federalism. Instead, I am arguing that a particular conception of
constitutional custom—traditional subjects of state regulation—
should not play any role in questions about the scope of Congress’s
commerce power.
It may be unsatisfying, particularly in a symposium on law and
custom, to conclude that a particular invocation of custom in a
particular legal setting is not doctrinally useful or intellectually
illuminating, at least as a general matter. What is interesting,
however, is why courts nonetheless persist in invoking traditional
subjects of state regulation in Commerce Clause cases. Lower federal
courts may feel obliged because the Supreme Court has directed them
89
to do so. But what about the Justices? Why, for example, does

is a first time for everything,” and his use of the word “sometimes” to qualify that
acknowledgement is doing a lot of unexplained work. Id. Moreover, the Court should always
consider the implications of any litigant’s arguments for the expanse and limits of federal power,
not just “when confronted with . . . new conceptions” of that power. Id. So it is unclear on
balance what Roberts’s view is on the constitutional pertinence of the unprecedented nature of
a federal law. In this passage, he may want to have it both ways.
86. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
87. Separation-of-powers questions are different from problems of constitutional
federalism in important ways. For example, because courts are more reluctant to intervene in
separation-of-powers controversies, custom may be among the few legal materials available for
consultation in debating issues of executive or congressional power. In addition, the idea of
“acquiescence” is not in play in Commerce Clause cases, but it is a major theme in separationof-powers arguments that invoke custom. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).
88. For example, perhaps past practice should inform whether a federal statute is best read
as preempting state law. If states have been regulating a certain subject in a certain way for a
long time, that fact, in a close case, might inform whether Congress is now saying that the states
may no longer regulate that subject in that way. But cf. supra note 74 (identifying problems with
reliance on regulatory custom in preemption cases).
89. See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18–19 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Appellants’[]
related argument is that upholding the mandate would turn the Commerce Clause into a federal
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Justice Kennedy purport to care “whether the exercise of national
90
power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern”?
What is it in the judicial temper that an appeal to constitutional
custom in this setting addresses?
These are big questions, and I cannot do them justice here. Part
of the answer may be that the Court recognizes the need for some
limits on both the commerce power and judicial discretion, and also
recognizes the problems with past formalisms in sensibly policing
91
those limits. But the Court may be erroneously imagining that an
appeal to traditional subjects of state regulation—notwithstanding
multiple past failures to deploy the same basic idea—can serve as a
sensible substitute. The Court seems to have an intuition about what
is “normal” for each level of government to do, but “[s]ometimes an
92
intuition is just an intuition.” Although the Court’s reaching for
some bounds is admirable, it should look elsewhere for the expanse
and limits of the commerce power—and of judicial power.
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A. Commercial Activity Versus Collective Action
In cases turning on whether the regulated conduct has substantial
effects on interstate commerce, the Court asks whether the object of
congressional regulation is properly categorized as “commercial” or
93
“economic” in nature. If it is, the Court asks whether the regulated
conduct, considered in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce and invariably concludes that the Commerce Clause
94
justifies federal regulation. If, however, the Court determines that
the regulated conduct is “noncommercial” or “noneconomic,” then it
disallows aggregation and holds that the commerce power does not
95
support the law.
Compared with customary allocation, the Court’s new formalism
has at least two advantages. First, it is judicially more administrable
and therefore better at cabining federal power and judicial
96
discretion. Second, it relates in some way to the main background
justification for the Commerce Clause. This is because problems that
are reasonably regarded as “commercial” may implicate collective
action problems involving multiple states.
93. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that Congress may use the
commerce power (1) to “regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3)
“to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (citations
omitted).
94. See id. at 560 (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”). In addition, five Justices recently
concluded that Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to require individuals to purchase a
product. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. In view of the unpopularity and
extraordinary rarity of purchase mandates, this new limit on federal commerce power seems
unlikely to play a significant role in shaping future legislation or litigation.
95. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (stressing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
“is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms”); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that “here neither the actors nor their conduct has a commercial
character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident commercial
nexus”).
96. For scholarship that stresses the virtues of formalism in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual
Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Stephen G.
Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987); Lessig, supra note 74; Robert G. Natelson, The Legal
Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006); and
Young, supra note 7.
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A primary problem with privileging commercial activity,
however, is that it is underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to
the primary justification for the Commerce Clause and Section 8
more generally. It is underinclusive because numerous
noncommercial activities implicate significant collective action
problems involving two or more states. It is overinclusive because
numerous commercial activities do not implicate collective action
97
problems involving two or more states.
The Court’s defenders may point to the text of the Commerce
Clause, which does, after all, use the word “Commerce.” They may
insist that an emphasis on commercial activity is required by that
textual inclusion of “Commerce.” They are right to point out that any
plausible interpretation of the constitutional text must provide an
account of the word “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause. For
example, Professor Jack Balkin, who also endorses a collective action
approach to the commerce power, has disputed the Court’s
“commercial” interpretation of the term “Commerce.” “In the
eighteenth century,” he argues, “‘commerce’ did not have such
narrowly economic connotations. Instead, ‘commerce’ meant
‘intercourse’ and it had a strongly social connotation. ‘Commerce’
98
was interaction and exchange between persons or peoples.”
Whether Professor Balkin is right or wrong about the original
semantic meaning of “Commerce,” the textual argument for
formalism neglects the balance of the clause, which references
99
commerce “among the several States.” The text itself does not
support the Court’s doctrinal position that if conduct is “Commerce,”
then it is “among the several States,” and that if conduct is not
“Commerce,” then it is not “among the several States.” The principal
advantage of focusing on the commercial status of the regulated

97. For example, the federal arson law, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006), appears problematic as
commerce power legislation even as applied to commercial enterprises. A federal ban on arson
of buildings actively employed for commercial purposes does not appear to address any
collective action problem or spillover effect involving multiple states. See Cooter & Siegel, supra
note 3, at 176 (“In controlling arson, one state does not have an incentive to free ride on the
laws of a neighboring state. Nor does one state try to exact concessions from another state by
threatening to reduce sanctions against arsonists.”).
98. Balkin, supra note 13, at 1; see also BALKIN, supra note 49, at 149–59 (noting that, in
the eighteenth century, “commerce” was understood broadly in terms of “‘intercourse’—that is,
interactions, exchanges, interrelated activities, and movements back and forth, including, for
example, travel, social connection, or conversation”—rather than “only business and the
exchange of commodities”).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

SIEGEL IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2012 4:23 PM

820

[Vol. 62:797

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

activity seems to lie more in judicial administrability than in fidelity to
the text. It allows the Court to avoid such questions as whether
commercial activities are interstate or intrastate in scope, but it does
not make them go away.
By contrast, focusing directly on collective action problems
“among the several States” avoids these problems of
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness with respect to the key
background justification for the Commerce Clause. A collective
action approach proceeds from the idea that the states often cannot
achieve an end when doing so requires multiple states to cooperate.
On this view, the clauses of Section 8 empower Congress to solve
collective action problems that frustrate the states. Such problems are
100
“truly national.” Conversely, problems with solutions that do not
require collective action by the states are internal to a state or “truly
101
local.” In this way, the allocation of regulatory authority in the
American federal system flows from the relative advantages of the
federal and state governments.
Unlike the distinction between noncommercial and commercial
activity, the distinction between individual and collective action by
states assigns specific meaning to the phrase “among the several
States” in the Commerce Clause. This phrase references a problem of
collective action involving two or more states. This is the key inquiry
in determining whether “Commerce” is interstate and thus regulable
under Clause 3, or is intrastate and thus beyond the scope of the
commerce power.
The main advantage of a collective action rationale lies in
avoiding errors of inclusion and exclusion by moving constitutional
doctrine closer to the principal background justification for the
Commerce Clause. Likewise, the primary disadvantages follow from
moving the doctrine closer to this purpose of the commerce power:
underdeterminacy, a potential lack of judicial administrablity, and
thus excessive judicial discretion. Reasonable minds often will differ
about (1) whether there is a problem of collective action involving
two or more states, (2) whether the problem is significant, and (3)
102
whether Congress’s response will ameliorate the problem. In
practice, the outcome of constitutional cases often will turn in
significant part on the level of deference that courts accord
100. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
101. Id.
102. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 181.
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congressional judgments about the existence and scope of collective
103
action problems, and about the adequacy of Congress’s response.
Accordingly, the choice between commercial activity and
collective action implicates the more general jurisprudential tension
104
between applying rules and applying their background justifications.
A good rule tends to provide clearer guidance than its background
justification and may generally do a better job of cabining judicial
discretion, but a rule is also underinclusive and overinclusive with
105
respect to its background justification. Those problems may cause
judges to refuse to be bound by the rule in cases in which the
106
background justification strongly suggests a different outcome.
Applying the background justification avoids substantial problems of
fit between the rule and the values it is charged with vindicating, but
such an approach raises problems of underdeterminacy, excessive
107
discretion, and error.
Each side in this jurisprudential debate over the scope of the
commerce power has its work cut out for it. Formalists who privilege
the commercial nature of the regulated conduct must demonstrate
that their approach is correct about the meaning of the term
“Commerce.” They must also show that their approach is relatively
determinate, administrable, and unsusceptible to judicial
manipulation. Finally, they must establish that these benefits

103. For a discussion of a potential standard of review for legislation purportedly addressing
multistate collective action problems, see id. at 180–83 and infra notes 123–124 and
accompanying text.
104. For an illuminating exploration of the tension between doctrinal rules and background
justifications in the context of First Amendment theory and doctrine, see generally Frederick
Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1989).
105. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“‘[F]reedom of speech’ is necessarily both underinclusive and
overinclusive with respect to its background justification, whatever that background justification
might be.”).
106. Cf. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 49–51 (1987)
(distinguishing the “real operative rule” from the “nominal rule” based on the exceptionality of
total rule enforcement); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1701 (1976) (arguing that rules become standards when “judges [are]
simply unwilling to bite the bullet, shoot the hostages, break the eggs to make the omelette and
leave the passengers on the platform”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 63 (1992)
(“[D]ecisionmakers [may] spend time inventing end-runs around [rules] because they just
cannot stand their over- or under-inclusiveness.”).
107. See Schauer, supra note 104, at 16 (“Still, the choice in the instruction for the
instantiation rather than the justification is based on the empirical supposition that these errors
are likely to be less in frequency and smaller in magnitude than the errors that might be
expected were the background justification alone used . . . .”).
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outweigh the costs of the approach, which are incurred when judges
conclude that conduct within the scope of the commerce power is
beyond its scope, and that conduct beyond the scope of the commerce
power is within its scope.
In practice, judges applying the commercial activity test appear
to exercise discretion of a functionalist character when the test is
underdeterminate. It is not self-evident how to identify what the
regulated subject matter is, nor is it self-evident how to determine
whether that subject matter is commercial in nature. For example, it is
not obvious why the personal possession or use of marijuana for
108
medicinal purposes pursuant to state law is commercial activity. Nor
is it clear why growing wheat on one’s own land for one’s family and
109
livestock qualifies as commercial activity. Yet the Court upheld
federal regulation of both under the Commerce Clause on the
asserted ground that they are part of a larger class of commercial
110
activity.
111
Writing for the Court in Gonzales v. Raich (the medical
112
marijuana case), Justice Stevens relied upon Wickard v. Filburn (the
wheat quota case), which he read as “establish[ing] that Congress can
regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in
that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate
that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate
113
market in that commodity.” The Court seemed to have been moved
less by the inherently commercial character of the general class of
conduct subject to federal regulation than by its interstate character—
that is, by the collective action problems that would impede state
114
regulation of the wheat and marijuana markets. In other words, the

108. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 45 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“What is the
relevant conduct subject to Commerce Clause analysis in this case?”).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 643 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It
was obvious in Wickard that growing wheat for consumption right on the farm was not
‘commerce’ in the common vocabulary, but that did not matter constitutionally . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
110. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (majority opinion); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29
(1942).
111. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
112. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
113. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
114. See, e.g., id. at 19 (“[O]ne concern prompting inclusion of wheat grown for home
consumption [in the 1938 Act at issue in Wickard] was that rising market prices could draw such
wheat into the interstate market, resulting in lower market prices. The parallel concern making
it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is the likelihood
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Court’s formal conclusion may have resulted from a functional
inquiry into the interstate scope of the problem. If true, the
“commercial activity” test, which purports to privilege formalist
inquiry into the commercial status of the object of federal regulation,
raises important questions of transparency about the fact of judicial
115
discretion and the grounds of judicial decisionmaking.
Even when the commercial activity test is relatively determinate,
judges applying it seek to avoid problems of underinclusiveness and
overinclusiveness. For example, federal courts presume that interstate
movements of persons, animals, or things are regulable under the
Commerce Clause by simple virtue of their interstate movements.
They so conclude without inquiring into the “commercial” status of
those movements. Examples include the movement of pollution or
116
species across state lines.
In essence, judges who apply the
conception of “Commerce” as “commercial activity” feel moved to
regard the Interstate Commerce Clause as the Interstate “or”
117
Commerce Clause.
Similarly, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court would
118
uphold federal power to quarantine —or to individually mandate
vaccination—in response to a flu pandemic that disrespected state
borders. Moreover, there is little doubt that the Court would do so
that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana into that market.”
(citation omitted)).
115. Formalism is often charged with occluding the actual reasons for a decision. See, e.g.,
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 719 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s
methodology is, in my view, substantially less transparent than mine.”); id. at 722 (stressing the
need for “judicial judgment exercised within a framework for constitutional analysis that guides
that judgment and which makes its exercise transparent”).
116. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the
Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of
the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 724 (2002) (“While the Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is ultimately more concerned with the impacts of activities upon interstate
commerce than the activities’ location, most judges and commentators have assumed that
whether a species is located in only one state or crosses state boundaries is an important factor.”
(footnotes omitted)).
117. Alternatively, these judges conceive of “Commerce” in terms that transcend
“commercial activity”—indeed, in terms that transcend even forms of human interaction outside
of markets.
118. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006) (authorizing the Surgeon General to make and enforce
regulations “necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession
into any other State or possession”). For a discussion of this federal quarantine statute and
related measures, see generally KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION
AUTHORITY (2007), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33201.pdf.
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under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding that an individual
would be subject to federal regulation based merely on her presence
119
in an affected area. One could attempt to tell various “commercial
activity” (or “channels” or “instrumentalities”) stories to justify
federal commerce power in this situation, but those stories likely
would not decide the case. The interstate character and gravity of the
120
problem would decide the case. As health law authority Professor
Mark Hall cautions, federal power “to mandate behavior,
unconditioned on citizens engaging in some economic activity,”
“might someday be absolutely essential to saving a million or more
lives, based on solid public health science, in the event of a
121
catastrophic public health emergency.”
Functionalists, too, have their work cut out for them. For one
thing, they require their own definition of “Commerce,” not just their
own definition of “among the several States.” For another thing, they
must demonstrate that a focus on the primary background
justification of the Commerce Clause is cost-justified because the
underdeterminacy it entails matters less than the errors it avoids. In
addition to limiting the kinds of interstate externalities that count as
122
collective action problems, collective action theorists need to
identify the level of judicial deference to accord congressional
judgments about the existence and scope of collective action
problems. I have elsewhere argued that there must be a reasonable
basis to believe that the federal law under review will ameliorate a
123
significant problem of collective action involving two or more states.
But that reasonableness standard leaves important questions
124
unanswered.
119. Cf. SWENDIMAN & ELSEA, supra note 118, at 4 (“Federal quarantine authority derives
from the Commerce Clause . . . .”).
120. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22, 29–30, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
1949 (2010) (No. 08-1224) (suggesting, in Justice Scalia’s and Justice Kennedy’s responses to the
Solicitor General’s hypothetical, that if a communicable disease among prisoners threatened the
larger population, the federal government could intervene under the commerce power to detain
infected prisoners beyond the terms of their sentences if the states were unable to address the
problem adequately).
121. Mark A. Hall, Constitutional Mortality: Precedential Effects of Striking the Individual
Mandate, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (2012).
122. For a discussion, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 152–54.
123. See, e.g., Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits, supra note 13, at 605 & n.51; Siegel, Free
Riding on Benevolence, supra note 13, at 32 & n.25.
124. The reasonableness test is derived from contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine,
which is generally—but not wholly—deferential. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama,
651 F.3d 529, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the
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B. A Return to Custom?
In the face of empirical uncertainties about the existence and
scope of multistate collective action problems, it may be tempting to
revisit, and attempt to reconstruct, constitutional custom—to rely on
some variant of past practice as part of the judicial inquiry that
125
collective action theorists commend. To illustrate with extreme—
and unrealistic—examples, imagine a movement in Congress to
federalize all of criminal law based on fears about races to severity in
punishment among the states. Or imagine a movement in Congress to
federalize all of education law based on fears about races to poor
quality in public education among the states. Such movements would
naturally raise the question of “why now?” in light of all the
regulatory water under the bridge.
Rather than focusing on whether the subject matter at issue has
been exclusively or predominantly regulated by the states or by the
federal government—approaches rejected in Part II—an inquiry into
past practice might examine the present extents of concurrent state
and federal regulation, which would define the status quo from which
the federal law under review sought to deviate. Greater deviations
from the status quo might require Congress to provide a stronger
basis in evidence for its conclusion that there exists a multistate
collective action problem of real significance.
A key issue is whether conceptualizing and operationalizing the
idea of past regulatory practice in this way avoids the problems with
invoking the idea of traditional subjects of state regulation. On the
one hand, a “status quo” approach would account for the present
reality of overlapping federal and state regulation. On the other hand,
it is not clear that the approach would avoid the problem of
indeterminacy. More fundamentally, it is not clear that the approach
would be asking the right question. For past congressional inaction to
be meaningful, one would have to believe that Congress is generally
responsive to collective action problems facing the states. Is it in the
nature of a multistate collective action problem that it is likely to

court in part) (“The courts do not apply strict scrutiny to commerce clause legislation and
require only an ‘appropriate’ or ‘reasonable’ ‘fit’ between means and ends.” (quoting Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1956–57)).
125. Cf. Epstein, supra note 81, at 2 (noting that the standards of custom and cost-benefit
analysis in the law of negligence would converge “[i]f courts and juries could effortlessly apply
the cost-benefit formulas” and “if customs always incorporated all the relevant information
about the costs and benefits of certain practices”).
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elicit a congressional response? I do not have an answer to that
question, but I at least know why I do not have an answer: having an
answer requires not just a theory of congressional power, but also a
126
theory of congressional process. One requires an account of
whether collective action problems facing the states are likely to get
on Congress’s agenda and, if they do, whether solutions to them will
be able to overcome the various “vetogates” that impede the passage
127
of federal legislation. I lack a persuasive theory of how Congress
functions as an institution. More importantly, so do the judges who
decide Commerce Clause cases.
My present inclination is to be skeptical that one should infer
much from past congressional inaction, even in cases of substantial
128
deviations from the regulatory status quo. To be sure, Congress has,
over the course of American history, often used its powers in Article
I, Section 8 to solve numerous collective action problems facing the
129
states. But in light of the powerful influence of committee chairs
130
and interest groups in Congress, the regulatory status quo at any
particular time may not reflect collective wisdom in the form of
131
solutions to multistate collective action problems. The status quo
132
may be as likely to reflect any number of things, including the cost-

126. I thank my Duke colleague Margaret Lemos for bringing this point to my attention.
127. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 78, at 5 (“Over 90% of all bills introduced in
Congress die in the legislative labyrinth.”).
128. Cf., e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The ‘complicated check on legislation’ erected by our Constitution creates an inertia that
makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act
represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter
the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5)
political cowardice.” (citation omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). Of course, one does not have to be a new textualist in
the area of statutory interpretation to reject “vindication by congressional inaction,” id., in the
different context of congressional inattention to collective action problems facing the states.
129. Part of the reason Congress has been able to do so is that each house operates
according to a majority or supermajority rule, not the unanimity rule that impedes voluntary
cooperation among states. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 139–44.
130. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 78, at 5–6 (discussing the power of committee chairs).
131. For Burkean arguments that past practice may embody collective wisdom, see
generally, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006);
Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994). Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (referencing “an area to which States lay claim by right of history and
expertise” (emphasis added)).
132. For some possibilities, see supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
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externalizing incentives of organized interests that benefit from races
133
to the bottom at the state level.
CONCLUSION
Of the three approaches to defining the scope of the Commerce
Clause explored in this Essay, the one centered on traditional subjects
of state regulation seems most difficult to defend. To the extent that
traditional areas of state regulation are defined as exclusive areas of
state regulation, the first variant is dual federalism by another name.
It has long been understood that dual federalism does not work in
modern America, where the federal government and the states have
concurrent legislative jurisdiction over many areas of life subject to
134
government regulation. Redefining traditional subjects of state
regulation as areas in which the states historically have predominated
is more defensible in theory, but it may prove indeterminate in
practice most of the time. In any event, it asks the wrong question
about the constitutional structure.
A variant of customary allocation reduces traditional subjects of
state regulation to a supporting role. To whatever extent it influences
outcomes in Commerce Clause litigation, it suffers from the same
problems as the stand-alone approach to regulatory custom.
More promising are the formal and functional approaches to the
Commerce Clause discussed in Part II. For the most part, I have
portrayed them as mutually exclusive. They need not be. In
“substantial effects” cases, commercial activity could be the doctrinal
test for whether Congress is regulating “Commerce,” and collective
action could be the doctrinal test for whether Congress is regulating
commerce that is “among the several States.”
For Commerce Clause functionalists, the most serious objection
to such an approach may be a lack of constitutional warrant for
Congress to regulate certain serious, noncommercial problems of
135
collective action involving multiple states. The problem could be

133. See, e.g., JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 22 (3d ed. 2010) (“Air pollution, water pollution, and wildlife certainly pay no heed to
state . . . borders, with the result that often the generator of the pollution is politically distinct
from those harmed.”).
134. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107–08
(2005) (“Without a broad reading of ‘Commerce’ in [Clause 3], it is not entirely clear whence
the federal government would derive its needed power to deal with noneconomic international
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overcome if constitutional authorization for federal power in such
136
situations could be found elsewhere in Article I, Section 8. That
solution, however, would probably be regarded as unacceptable
clause shifting by Commerce Clause formalists. Accordingly, the
commercial activity and collective action approaches may continue to
be viewed as competitors, not as complements, in debates over the
expanse and limits of the commerce power.
I note a final possibility, which may best describe the Supreme
Court’s current practice. The Court’s distinction between commercial
and noncommercial subject matter will remain the black-letter test
because it appears more determinate and administrable than a focus
on collective action problems facing the states. But because the
distinction is not in fact determinate, and because it produces
nontrivial problems of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness,
collective action reasoning will continue to inform the Court’s
judgment regarding whether the object of congressional regulation is
commercial in nature—and thus interstate in scope.

incidents—or for that matter to address the entire range of vexing nonmercantile interactions
and altercations that might arise among states.”).
136. For an unconventional suggestion that the General Welfare Clause might do some of
the work, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 170–75.

